董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司业绩--合谋还是共同激励？被引量：55

On the Director Compensation,CEO Compensation and Firm's Performance

导出

摘要本文从中国沪深两市观测到的上市公司中CEO和董事薪酬的趋同现象,综合代理理论和乘员理论等多理论基础,基于薪酬激励和公司治理绩效的关系,考察了董事与CEO之间的合谋、单边激励和共同激励等复杂关系。论文采用2005-2007年度我国上市公司样本池数据,通过混合回归、固定效应回归和敏感性分析等实证检验发现,我国董事与CEO薪酬激励已初步与公司业绩挂钩,但是研究揭示CEO激励走在董事绩效激励前面,董事激励不足问题突出。进一步的研究发现上市公司中CEO薪酬与公司业绩正向相关,董事薪酬对公司业绩没有显著影响;结论认为我国上市公司中董事与CEO关系并非简单合谋或共同激励关系,而是处于CEO选择合适角色或监控得当,董事仍持代理角色,并且其战略指导要弱于监控作用的"单边激励"状况。 Based on the Stewardship theory and Agency theory, the paper analyzes the complex relationships between CEO and directors of board. The authors hypothesize there exist such three kinds of relationships as collusion, one - side incentive and mutual incentive if only considering the consistent correlation of CEO＇s compensa- tion and director＇s compensation. Then, the authors test those relationships by surveying Chinese listed companies of 2005 -2007 on the association between their compensation and firm performance. By using Pooled regress, Fixed - effect regress and sensitivity analysis, the results show CEO＇s compensation is related positively to finn＇s future performance but directors＇ compensation doesn＇t take an effect on finn performance though both of them are positively correlated significantly, so there is one - side incentive situation instead of collusion or mu- tual incentives in Chinese listed companies, which means CEO choose the suitable role while directors play agents＇ roles and lead to boards＇ strategy role weaker than their control roles. The further test finds that CEO＇ incentive compensation is better than director＇s incentive compensation regardless of CEO＇s compensation and director＇s compensation are both related to the firm prophase performance, so boards should take an efficiency incentive mechanism on directors in China.

作者杨青高铭 Besim Burcin Yurtoglu

机构地区复旦大学金融研究院复旦大学经济学院 Department of Economies

出处《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第6期111-127,共17页 Journal of Financial Research

基金教育部人文社科(项目批准号:07JC630057) 上海社科(项目批准号:2008BJB018)资助

关键词董事薪酬 CEO薪酬合谋共同激励代理理论乘员理论 director＇s compensation, CEO compensation, mutual collusion, mutual incentive, agency theory,Stewardship theory

分类号 F272 [经济管理—企业管理] F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

引文网络
相关文献

参考文献31

1Adams R. B. , 2000," What do boards do? Evidence from committee meeting and director compensation data", Working Paper.
2Agrawal Anup, Chadha Sahiba. , 2005, "Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals", Journal of Law& Economics, Oct, Vol. 48 Issue 2, pp. 371-406.
3Becher D. , Campbell T. , Frye M. , 2006, "Incentive compensation for bank directors: the impact of deregulation", Journal of Business 79.
4Berle Adolph J. and Means Gardiner C. , 1932, "The Modern Corporation and Private Property", New York: Macmillan.
5Berry Tammy K. , Paige Fields L , Wilkins Michael S. , 2006, "The interaction among multiple governance mechanisms in young newly public finns", Journal of Corporate Finance , 12, pp. 449 - 466.
6Black B. , Cheffins B. , Klausner M. , 2004, "Outside director hability", Stanford Law School Working Paper 250.
7Core John E. , Guay Wayne R. , Verrecchia Robert E. , 2003, "Price versus Non - Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts" ,Accounting Review, Oct, Vol. 78 Issue 4, pp. 957-981.
8Core, John E. and Larcker David F. , 2002, "Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownership", Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 64, Issue 3, June , pp. 317 -340.
9Eisenhardt Kathleen M. , Kahwajy Jean L , Bourgeois Ⅲ L J. , 1997, "Conflict and Strategic Choice: How Top Management Teams Disagree. " California Management Review, Winter, Vol. 39 Issue 2, pp. 42 - 62.
10Eisenhardt, K. M. , 1989, "Agency theory: An assessment and review", Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 57-74.