摘要
This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.
This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.
基金
Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos 70671079, 60674050, 60736022 and 60528007)
National 973 Program (Grant No 2002CB312200)
National 863 Program (Grant No 2006AA04Z258)
11-5 project (Grant NoA2120061303)
