摘要
高质量会计信息能通过改善契约和监督,降低道德风险和逆向选择来提高公司投资效率。以我国沪深上市公司为研究样本,我们实证发现,在其他条件一定的情况下,会计信息质量分别与公司投资不足和投资过度负相关,同时会计信息质量与投资过度的负相关性在具有较高审计质量的公司中更明显。因此,本文的政策建议是加快完善我国上市公司财务报告和披露系统的市场基础设施,同时鼓励国内事务所之间的强强联合或与外资所合作、合资,提高审计监督质量,加强制度创新以更好地发挥会计信息在公司资本配置中的作用。
High quality accounting information can reduce both adverse selection and moral hazard by improving contracting and monitoring.Through our listed corporations＇data we fred proxies for accounting information quality, namely self-constructed composite measure,are negatively associated with both corporate overinvestment and corporate underinvestment,while the effect of high quality accounting information on overinvestment is more significant with high auditing monitoring quality, Therefore,we should develop our infrastructure for an economically efficient system of public financial reporting and disclosure,while encourage our auditors to make win-win cooperation with each other or co-operation,joint venture with foreign auditors,which further systematically innovates to make accounting information＇s role of allocating caoital better.
出处
《审计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期65-73,51,共10页
Auditing Research
基金
自然科学基金青年项目(项目号:70702017)
关键词
会计信息质量
审计监督
投资不足
投资过度
accounting information quality, auditing monitoring, underinvestment, overinvestment
