摘要
按照西方央行与公众理论的推论，公众的工资增长率一般会低于同期的实际通货膨胀率．而本文通过对我国一段时期商品零售价格总指数、ＧＤＰ（国内生产总值）增长率以及职工平均货币工资指数数据的研究分析，表明有与上述推论不同的结果．为了解释这种区别，建立了一个关于我国央行与公众的博弈模型，并提出建立完善的税收和审计制度的迫切性．
According to inference from western theory of central bank and the public,the wage rate of the public should commonly be lower than real rate of inflation in the same year.However,different result is got in this paper based on analyzing the data of index number of retail price,index number of worker′s vaerage monetary wage and rate of GDP in China.To expound the difference,a theoretical model related to the game between central bank and the public was built.In author′s view,devaluating matured national debt possibly is one of motivations for central bank to agitate inflation,the public could do reflex soon to national economy due to the great change in wage structure after economic reform,and the fact that index number of wage is bigger than index number of price suggests that“internal control”phenomenon exists in stateowned enterprises.So,the urgent task for economic reform is to perfect tax and auditing systems.
出处
《上海理工大学学报》
CAS
1998年第2期168-171,共4页
Journal of University of Shanghai For Science and Technology
