摘要
政府竞争是政府运用税收、补贴、基础设施等手段吸引可流动的人力、投资等资源,目的在于促进本地经济的增长,迎合本地居民需要。但是在晋升博弈背景下的政府竞争则由于由官员的收益代替了居民的收益作为地区收益的代表,因此出现了地区基础设施同质化和以高额补助方式进行恶性竞争的招商引资大战。通过对贾斯特曼-蒂斯模型的拓展,我们论证了进行政治体制改革是解决我国政府间恶性竞争的关键,成立具有约束力的区域协调机构或区域合并能够提高本区域的收益水平,通过促进人口自由流动等方式建立"用脚投票"机制,可以作为对政治体制改革滞后的一种有益弥补。
Governments＇ competition refers to the governments use tax,subsidy and infrastructure to absorb floatable resource such as human resource, investment.The competition can improve local economic growth and local residents＇ benefit. Under promotion game,there will be homogeneous infrastructure and high subsidy for attracting investment because the officials＇ revenue being the region＇s revenue.Through extending Justman Thisse model,we prove that the key strategy to solve the problem is political reform. Powerful regional coordination system, region merging and setting up ＂voting by feet mechanism＂ by free floating of inhabitants can make up the lag of political reform.
出处
《上海金融学院学报》
2009年第3期34-41,共8页
Journal of Shanhai Finance University
基金
上海市教委科研创新项目(编号08ZS173)
