摘要
本文以2002年度沪深A股市场发生并购的420家公司为样本,分析上市公司股权结构对并购公司短期以及长期绩效的影响,以及企业规模的调节作用。研究结果表明:在绩效较差的公司中,大股东更多体现出对管理者进行有效监督的正面效应;随着企业规模的增加,大股东的监管效应增强,而法人股股东更倾向于侵占中小股东利益,但这种侵占效应不会长期存在;在绩效较好的公司中,大股东侵占其他股东的动机较为强烈;此外,随着企业规模的增加,政府对企业的过多介入不利于企业的长期发展。本文研究对并购公司管理者与股东之间以及大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题提供了有益的启示。
This paper empirically tests the effects of ownership structure on the short and long-run post-acquisition performance of Chinese listed companies as well as the moderating role of firm size. The results show that in the companies with poor post-acquisition performance, the largest shareholders have the positive effect on governing managers ; with increase of firm sizes, the positive effect of largest shareholders increased, and the shareholders of legal person shares prefer to expropriate the benefits of other shareholders in a short period ; in the companies with good post-acquisition performance, the largest shareholders have motivation to expropriate the benefits of other shareholders ; with increase of firm sizes, the overly participating by the government blocked the long-term development of companies. This study has the important reference value for agency problems between managers and shareholders, or largest shareholders and other shareholders of M＆A companies.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第9期123-134,共12页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
股权结构
并购绩效
规模效应
代理问题
ownership structure, post-acquisition performance, size effect, agency problem
