摘要
本文从放松新古典完全竞争市场中没有沉淀成本的假设前提入手,在区分固定成本和沉淀成本概念的基础上,运用一个有无沉淀成本的古诺纳什均衡经济模型分析它们各自对企业重组的经济效率和福利水平的不同影响,进而发现,沉淀成本而不是固定成本(规模经济或企业规模)是影响企业重组经济效率和福利水平最基本的经济变量。依据这样的经济模型,我们发现,在国有企业重组过程中,因资产专用性、交易成本和生产过程等原因,沉淀成本普遍存在,严重降低了国有企业重组的经济效率和福利水平。因此,为了提高国有企业重组的经济效率,我们提供制度创新或政策创新的基本原则,关键在于减少或补偿沉淀成本,促进生产要素充分流动,从而创造出一个可竞争的市场经济环境。
The paper is to relax the assumptions of neoclassic perfect competition and contestable paradigm, and build up a simple economic model. We analyze the consequence of firm restructuring in terms of the difference between sunk and fixed costs. The production possibility curve and indifference curve are to distinguish between the effect of the null and positive sunk costs on firm restructuring. As a result we have found that,not fixed costs,but sunk costs,are the only economic factor that influences the economic efficiency and welfare of firm restructuring. Additionally we apply the economic model to the state-owned enterprise restructuring and provide the solutions to sunk cost barriers,that is, reduce or recover the sunk costs to promote the factor mobility,including market institution perfection, reduction of transaction cost under non-market institution and govemment interventions towards sunk cost management.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第10期118-126,共9页
China Industrial Economics
基金
吉林大学交叉学科前沿创新项目"法律
融资环境对我国企业成长的影响研究"(批准号2008JC003)
国家社会科学基金项目"资源枯竭地区经济转型和可持续发展研究"(批准号08CJY021)
关键词
固定成本
沉淀成本
国有企业
重组博弈
fixed cost
sunk cost
state-owned enterprise
restructuring game
