摘要
"道德应该"是当下道德哲学的主要问题之一。思想史上对于"道德应该"为"信"的哲学论证都不免陷入某种理论困境,因此,"道德应该"作为问题要从"存在"说起。在"存在"作为"无"而具有的"可能"视域中,"道德应该"的特质是悖论。其悖论意义是指从"道德应该"的规劝出发,沿着人们为"信"的逻辑轨道,必然地推出与其正相反对的"道德不应该"的规劝也是道德的,正相反对的"应该"与"不应该"在道德评价上是等价的。"道德应该"的悖论特质来自于"存在"。"存在"作为"无"体现为"可能",由存在的这种"可能"与"不可能"的正相反对,就使得在"存在"作为"可能"之"好"、"善"的区别里,已经包裹了"道德应该"的悖论意义。"道德应该"的特质是悖论的论断,一方面打破了原有的对"道德应该"普遍必然之绝对意义的理性依恋,另一方面也使我们从追求以普遍必然的"道德应该"作为道德践行评价标准的理论迷雾中警醒。
In the history of thought, ＂moral should＂ as ＂faithfulness＂ all come into the theoretical paradox, so we should start with ＂existence＂. ＂Existence＂ as ＂nothing＂ in the perspective of ＂possibility＂, ＂moral should＂ is paradox, in the result that ＂moral should not＂ should be moral, for ＂ should＂ or ＂should not＂ is equal in morality. Because ＂possibility＂ and ＂impossibility＂ are opposite, making ＂existence＂ have ＂goodness＂ and ＂kindness＂, the paradox is included in it. This paradox has broken through the absolute significance of ＂moral should＂ and awaken us that ＂moral should＂ is not a standard theory in the evaluation of moral practice.
出处
《河北学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第6期62-67,共6页
Hebei Academic Journal
关键词
道德应该
存在
可能
自由意志
悖论
＂moral should＂
existence
possibility
free will
paradox
