摘要
本文从我国转型环境中地区差异的角度出发,以薪酬管制为制度背景,以上市公司为样本,对如下两个问题进行了实证检验:(1)地方政府实施薪酬管制受到哪些因素的影响?(2)薪酬管制会否引致更多的高管腐败?研究发现:对不同地方的国有企业,薪酬管制明显受到地区市场化进程、贫富差距、财政赤字和失业率等因素的影响;薪酬管制的存在与高管腐败发生的概率正相关。本文的发现为理解我国国有企业薪酬结构的成因及其经济后果提供了有益的帮助。
Starting from the regional difference in the period of China’s economic transition, in the context of the system of the regulation of emolument(ROE), and taking listed companies as our specimens, we have made an empirical examination for the following two questions: (1) what factors affect local governments’ ROE ? (2) will the ROE cause more corruption practiced by high-ranking managers? By our study, we have discovered that, concerning state-owed enterprises in different places, the ROE has been obviously influenced by the regional process of marketization, the gap between the rich and the poor, the financial deficit and the employment rate, and that the existence of the ROE has been positively related to the probability of the occurrence of the corruption of high-ranking manages. Our findings made in this article will help comprehend the root of the structure of the emolument in China’s state-owned enterprises, and the economic consequences wherefrom.
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第11期130-143,共14页
Journal of Management World
基金
国家自然科学基金课题70602011的研究成果
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划
南京大学经济转型与发展研究中心"经济增长与结构转型研究"985计划课题
上海财经大学会计与财务研究院资助
