摘要
鉴于森林认证的迅速发展以及在中国的起步态势,建立林业企业实施森林认证的动力机制的囚徒困境、古诺模型及离散型贝叶斯博弈模型,对林业企业实施森林认证行为的进行博弈分析。认为对于实施森林认证的林业企业而言,其类型应属于强类型,即在林产品贸易过程中同林产品的需求者的讨价还价占据优势地位。相对而言保持强势的价格谈判姿态有利于实施森林认证的林业企业在林产品的经营过程中获取更高的利润。
In view of the rapid development of forest certification, as well as the starting situation in China, to set up forestry enterprises＇ implementation of forest certification power mechanism＇ s Prisoner＇s Dilemma, Cournot model and discrete Bayesian game model, mainly by game analyzes the forestry enterprises to carry out implementation of forest certification behavioral. It concluded that for the implementation of forest certification of forestry enterprises, its type should be strongly typed, that is, in the course of trade in forest products with the demand for forest products are dominated by the status of bargaining. Relatively speaking, the price of maintaining a strong stance in favor of negotiating the implementation of forest certification of forestry enterprises operating in the process of forest products to obtain higher profits.
出处
《中国农学通报》
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第21期116-121,共6页
Chinese Agricultural Science Bulletin
基金
福建省教育厅项目"林业企业实施森林认证的动力机制研究"(2007JA07099S)
福建省社会科学规划项目(2009B061)
关键词
林业企业
森林认证
博弈分析
林产品贸易
forestry enterprises
forest certification
game analysis
forest products trade
