摘要
通过引入管理者与投资者之间的信念分歧发现,公司的资本结构和股利政策的选择受同一个因素所驱动,即由共同被管理者和投资者之间的控制权分配的治理机制决定。债务与权益比率越高和股利支付率越高,将使投资者拥有更大的控制权。不考虑代理和信息不对称问题,由于经营者和投资者之间的信念分歧导致的控制权问题将产生对项目选择的分歧。这种潜在分歧的程度依赖于公司以前的业绩。
By introducing divergence of beliefs between the manager and the investors, we find that capital structure and dividend policy are driven by the same underlying factor and jointly determined by the implicit governance mechanisms to allocating control over real （project choice） decisions between the manager and the investors. Higher debt-equity ratios and higher dividend payouts lead to greater investor control. Despite the absence of agency or asymmetric information problems, control matters because of a divergence of beliefs between the manager and the investors could lead to disagreement over the project choice. The extent of the potential disagreement depends upon the firm＇ s prior performance.
出处
《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2009年第6期481-485,共5页
Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences
关键词
资本结构
股利政策
公司业绩
先念信念
capital structure
dividend policy
firm＇ s performance
prior beliefs
