摘要
研究目的:构建地方政府与失地农民的博弈模型,找出促使均衡结果合理化的因素变化关系。研究方法:博弈论。研究结果:减小失地农民的维权成本,增加失地农民的征地收益,加大对地方政府违法征地的惩罚力度,可以促使地方政府与失地农民之间博弈均衡更合理化,可以有效抑制地方政府违法征地的冲动,减少失地农民上访维权的现象,避免征地冲突的发生,促进社会经济和谐发展。
The purpose of this paper is to design the game theory model between local government and land-lost peasants, and find out the correlative factors which can make the equilibrium of the game more reasonable. The method of game theory was employed. The results indicate that the reduction of the costs of the land- lost peasants for protecting their property rights, the increase of land- lost peasants＇ benefit from land acquisition, as well as the enhancement of punishing local governments＇ illegal land acquisition activities can make the equilibrium of the game between local government and land-lost peasants more reasonable, which effectively restrains the impulsion of illegal land acquisition of local government, reduces the frequency of appealing to up-level government for their property rights by the land-lost peasants, avoids the conflicts caused by land acquisition, as well as promotes the harmonious development of the whole society.
出处
《中国土地科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第11期27-31,37,共6页
China Land Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"我国城市化加速推进中农村土地冲突的发生率
发育机理及损害研究"(70573036)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目"我国经济社会转型时期的土地冲突问题及管理创新"(06JA790041)
关键词
征地冲突
博弈
失地农民
利益相关者
land-acquisition conflict
game theory
land-lost peasants
stakeholders
