摘要
中国政府行为的一个突出现象是,在执行来自上级部门特别是中央政府的各种指令政策时,基层上下级政府常常共谋策划、暗渡陈仓,采取"上有政策、下有对策"的各种手段,来应付这些政策要求以及随之而来的各种检查,导致了实际执行过程偏离政策初衷的结果。本文从组织学角度,对这类现象提出一个理论解释。本文的中心命题是:在中国行政体制中,基层政府间的共谋行为已经成为一个制度化了的非正式行为;这种共谋行为是其所处制度环境的产物,有着广泛深厚的合法性基础。本文讨论政府组织制度的三个悖论,对这一现象提出理论解释:一是政策一统性与执行灵活性的悖论,二是激励强度与目标替代的悖论,三是科层制度非人格化与行政关系人缘化的悖论。本研究强调,共谋行为不能简单地归咎于政府官员或执行人员的素质或能力,其稳定存在和重复再生是政府组织结构和制度环境的产物;是现行组织制度中决策过程与执行过程分离所导致的结果;在很大程度上也是近年来政府制度设计特别是集权决策过程和激励机制强化所导致的非预期结果。而欲改变这一状况,首先需要对政府组织现象进行深入系统的研究,提出有力的理论解释。
A salient organizational phenomenon in the Chinese bureaucracy is collusion among local governments in response to policies and directives from higher authorities; local governments often form alliances to compromise the original intention behind state policies. There are thus significant and persistent deviations and goal displacement in policy implementation. This article develops an organizational analysis and theoretical explanation of this phenomenon. It argues as follows： Collusion among local governments, though informal, is generated and perpetuated by the institutional logic of the Chinese bureaucracy, results from organizational adaptation to its environment, and hence acquires legitimacy and becomes highly institutionalized. In particular, the institutional logic of the Chinese bureaucracy has generated three organizational paradoxes-uniformity in policy-making and flexibility in implementation, incentive intensity and goal displacement, bureaucratic impersonality and the personalization of administrative ties-which provide legitimate bases for collusion among local governments. Bureaucratic collusion has been greatly exacerbated in recent years because of the unintended consequences of the centralization of authority and the enforcement of incentive mechanisms in the bureaucracy.
出处
《开放时代》
CSSCI
2009年第12期40-55,共16页
Open Times
