摘要
对于专利池的形成之困,本文基于博弈分析提出一种新解释:专利池的形成实际上是一个"囚徒困境"问题,无论是专门从事研发的专利权人还是既研发又生产的专利权人都存在机会主义动机背离合作而选择充当池外许可人,导致专利池难以形成。除非在动态重复博弈中出现可置信的严厉惩罚,如面临残酷的技术标准竞争或反垄断诉讼的威胁,专利权人才可能达成合作而组建专利池。
Forming a patent pool is not only efficient to patent holders but also to society. However, patent pools have not emerged as massively as people anticipated. This paper provides a new explanation： the formation of a patent pool is actually a ＂Prisoners＇ Dilemma problem＂. In fact, not only a specialized research finn but also a vertically integrated manufacturing firm, has an incentive to stay outside the patent pool and license its patents independently. However, in infinitely repeated games, the Prisoners＇ Dilemma could be overcome by some credible threats and promises, such as fierce competition for technology （standard） and antitrust litigatioh.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第11期42-52,共11页
China Soft Science
基金
国家社科基金重大招标项目(07&ZD006)
国家自科基金重点项目(70633003)
关键词
专利池
专利灌丛
形成机理
囚徒困境
patent pool
patent thickets
formation
prisoners＇ dilemma
