摘要
生态公益林在林权制度改革后由国家直接经营变为私人家庭承包。由于生态公益林有重要的生态地位,因此,国家规定林农对生态公益林不具有自由处置权,林农实际上充当护林员的角色。然而,林农拥有生态公益林的信息量较政府占优,政府对林农在自然灾害突发事件前后的防范与修复工作无从得知,于是就形成了政府与林农在不对称信息下的委托—代理关系。为解决此问题,我们建立描述突发事件的随机变量,通过委托—代理模型的理论推导,得出了为使生态公益林的社会生态效益达到最大化,而对林农实行的线性激励方式,并对此做出帕累托经济效率分析。该激励方式能促使林农更好地履行保护生态公益林的义务。
Forest tenure reform transform the supervision of ecological forest directly by government into the management of private contracting family. However, farmers have no right to dispose ecological forest freely, but contracting families dominate the informations of ecological forest,so government have no way to know what farmers had done before or during the natural risks. Thus, a principal - agent relationship between government and foresters was established. We establish a random variable to describe incidents, then through principal- agent model to conclude a linear incentives for farmers to maximize social ecological benefits, and to make Pareto analysis of economic efficiency.
出处
《西安财经学院学报》
2010年第1期10-14,共5页
Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics
