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供应链质量风险管理的单委托—多代理激励模型研究 被引量:1

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摘要 质量激励合同是供应链质量风险管理的重要途径,本文考虑由一个制造商和两个供应商组成的供应链,从制造商对供应商质量风险监管的角度出发,建立了单委托人—多代理人质量激励模型,拓展分析了影响激励报酬系数和供应商质量风险防范水平的各种不同因素,为供应链质量风险管理环境下建立有效的质量激励合同提供理论依据。
作者 高滔 顾力刚
出处 《中国管理信息化》 2010年第1期73-75,共3页 China Management Informationization
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参考文献8

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