期刊文献+

风险投资中的证券设计:转换权与清算权 被引量:1

Security Design in Venture Capital Financing: Conversion and Liquidation Right
下载PDF
导出
摘要 本文在不完全合约的背景下,研究了风险投资中的证券设计问题,风险投资家持有可转换债券,而创业者持有普通股。本文考察了两种定约情形,第一种是创业者向风险投资家提供合约,合约双方存在一个再谈判博弈;第二种是风险投资家向创业者提供合约,存在一个双方前后相继行动的动态博弈。本文分析了这两个博弈,设计了能够诱导合约双方最优努力的可转换债券,刻画了风险投资家如何监控项目、配置权利与放弃低值项目的风险投资合约特点。 Based on incomplete theory, this paper studies the problem of security design in venture capital financing. The venture capitalist (VC) holds convertible bond, and the entrepreneur holds common stocks. This paper analyzes two contracting situation. Firstly, the entrepreneur offers a contract to the VC, and there exists a renegofiafion game between the two parties. Secondly, the venture capitalist offers contract to VC, and this leads to a dynamic game that both parties take actions one after another. The paper analyzes the two games and proposes a convertible stock that can lead to the best efforts of both parties, and shows how the VC to monitor the project, to allocate the rights and to give up bad project.
作者 郭文新 曾勇
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第1期101-109,共9页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70540022) 教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目(教技函[2005]35号) 电子科技大学青年基金项目(JX03142)
关键词 风险投资 不完全合约 可转换债券 自动转换权 再谈判 venture capital incomplete contract theory convertible bond automatic conversion renegotiation
  • 相关文献

参考文献23

  • 1Sahlman WA. The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(2): 473 - 521.
  • 2Kaplan SN, Stromberg P. Financial contracting theory meets the real world: Evidence from venture capital contracts [ J ]. Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 70(2): 281-315.
  • 3Lemer J, Hardymon F, Leamon A. Venture capital and private equity: A casebook[M]. Newyork: John Wiley & Sons Ine, 2000.
  • 4Grossman S J, Hart O. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration [ J ]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4) : 691 - 719.
  • 5Holmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability [ J ] Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10(1) : 73 - 91.
  • 6Mirrlees J. The theory of moral hazard and unobservable behavior: Part I[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66(226) : 3 - 21.
  • 7Schmidt K. Convertible securities and venture capital finance [ J ]. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58(3) : 1139 - 1167.
  • 8HeUman T, Purl M. The interaction between product market and financial strategy: The role of venture capital[J]. Review of Financial studies, 2000, 13(4): 959-1043.
  • 9Hellman T, Purl M. Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up firms : Empirical evidence[ J]. Journal of Finance, 2002, 57 (1): 169-229.
  • 10Kaplan SN, Stromberg P. Characteristics, contracts, and actions : Evidence from venture capitalist analyses [ J ]. Journal of Finance, 2004, 59(5) : 2177 - 2210.

二级参考文献74

  • 1Gomper P A, Lerner J. Money chasing deals? The impact of fund inflows on private equity valuation [ J ]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 55(2): 281-235.
  • 2Matthews S A. Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity [ J ]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2001, 97 ( 1 ) : 1-29.
  • 3Gomper P A. Venture capital growing pains: Should the market diet? [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998, 22(6-8) : 1089-1104.
  • 4Modigliani F, Miller M H. The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment [ J ]. The American Economic Review, 1958, 48(3): 261-297.
  • 5Kaplan S N, Stromberg P. Finan 和 cial contracting theory meets the real world: Evidence from venture capital contracts [ J ]. Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 70 (2) : 281-315.
  • 6Casamatta C. Financing and advising: Optimal financial contracts with venture capitalists [ J ]. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58 (5) : 2059-2087.
  • 7Schmidt K. Convertible securities and venture capital finance [ J ]. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58 (3) : 1139-1167.
  • 8Repullo R, Suarez J. Venture capital finance : A security design approach [ J ]. Review of Finance, 2004, 8 ( 1 ) : 75-108.
  • 9Inderst R, Mailer H M. The effect of capital market characteristics on the value of start-up firms [ J ]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2004, 72(2): 319-356.
  • 10Sahlman W A. The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations[ J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27 (2) : 473-521.

共引文献33

同被引文献5

引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部