股票期权激励契约合理性及其约束性因素——基于中国上市公司的实证分析被引量：60

The Rationality and Restrictive Factors of Stock Option Incentive Contracts——Based on the Data of China's Listed Companies

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摘要股权激励是完善上市公司治理的重要环节。设计适合中国上市公司特征的股权激励方案并规避其所带来的风险是使其发挥作用的关键。本文以2006—2008年公布与实施股票期权激励方式的中国上市公司为样本,对股票期权激励契约的合理性特征及其内生约束性因素进行了理论探讨与实证检验,研究表明,激励期限与绩效条件是体现股票期权契约合理性的关键要素,除外部法律与监管约束之外,大股东、债务融资与独立董事等内生性因素对两者具有显著的约束作用,进一步证实了公司内部治理机制的互补效应假说,为上市公司股票期权契约的设计与实施提供有益参考。 Equity-based Incentive is an important part to improve listed companies＇ corporate governance level. Designing reasonable and effective stock option contracts is the key to success. In this paper, we adopt the data of listed companies that have announced and ones have yet implemented stock option plans in China to do the empirical research. The results show that long-term and incentive are the main features of stock option and time horizon and performance condition are the key elements to embody them. Besides external factors, majority shareholders, creditors and independent directors are main restrictive factors to influence the rationality of stock options. We hope the results can supply useful references to China＇s listed companies and regulators.

作者徐宁徐向艺

机构地区山东大学管理学院

出处《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第2期100-109,共10页 China Industrial Economics

关键词股票期权契约合理性约束因素股权激励 stock option rationality restrictive factor equity incentives

分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理]

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