金字塔控股集团与公司价值研究被引量：25

Pyramidal Controlled Groups and Firm Value

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摘要企业集团在世界各国普遍存在,并以金字塔股权结构作为最主要的组织架构模式。本文从终极控制人的性质、现金流量权与控制权的分离、垂直层级、横向跨度、上市公司在金字塔结构中的身份这五个方面回顾和梳理了相关文献,发现金字塔控股对公司价值的影响具有双向性。控股股东的"隧道挖掘"和过度投资导致了金字塔控股的折价效应;而集团内部市场对不完全市场的替代,金字塔纵向组织分权的激励作用都会产生溢价效应。从"金字塔股权结构"到"金字塔控股集团"的变化,不仅把单纯的股权结构研究扩展到组织结构的研究,而且丰富了企业边界理论。市场化程度的提高和投资者保护的加强对金字塔控股集团折价或溢价效应的影响还有待进一步的研究。 Business groups are all around the world, except United States and Britain. Pyramidal structure is the main mode in which business groups are organized. We review the literature of pyramidal controlled groups and its influence on firm value from five areas： the type of the ultimate owner, the separation of cash flow rights and control rights, vertical levels, width and the status of the public company in the group. The pyramidal structure has two-way effect on firm value. Controlling shareholders＇ tunneling and over investment have discount effect on the value of pyramidal controlled companies, but internal market as the substitution of imperfect market and the incentive effect of decentralization have premium effect. Transform from the ＂pyramidal ownership structure＂ to the ＂pyramidal controlled group＂ not only extends the research from pure ownership structure to the organizational structure, but also enriches the theory of the boundary of the firm. The question need further study is how the more developed market and better investor protection would influence the discount or premium effect of pyramidal controlled groups.

作者王蓓郑建明

机构地区对外经济贸易大学国际财务与会计研究中心对外经济贸易大学国际商学院

出处《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第2期110-119,共10页 China Industrial Economics

基金教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目"利益相关者审计体系研究"(批准号ncet-06-0144) "211工程"三期重点学科建设项目子课题"‘走出去’战略中企业信用评价相关法律制度研究"(批准号73400050)

关键词金字塔控股集团公司价值股权结构隧道效应公司治理 pyramidal controlled groups firm value ownership structure tunneling corporate governance

分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理]

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