“双高”现象、银企博弈与转型经济融资环境的影响被引量：23

Why Cash Reserve and Short Term Leverage Simultaneously Overhang among Chinese Listed Companies?

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摘要中国资本市场长期持续的双高现象,偏离了公司价值最大化的要求,其背后是在转型经济的融资环境影响下银企博弈的结果。银行在贷前以及贷后监督角色的欠缺,给了企业操纵借贷时间、传递误导信号的机会,以此扩大其当期融资能力并服务于跨期融资。当实际控制人具有掏空动机时,短期借款会明显超过正常经营的需要。在双高后期,为免各自利益受损,银企达成合谋,企业则出现了更为严重的借新还旧。 This paper aims to analyze a peculiar phenomenon that 89 listed companies in China have both higher short term leverages and cash reserves consecutively for more than 2 years.Such financial pattern cannot be clearly explained by classical theories.In fact,it arises from dynamic gaming between bankers and real controllers of listed firms with their pursuits of individual interest maximization under the influence of the transition economy institutions in China.The analysis reveals that the firms disguise them as good ones to avoid financial constrains and serve the needs of real controllers tunneling.But bankers don＇t see through the trick.Till loan matures,firms and creditors tend to conspire to refinance the non-performing debt to avoid it from betraying cloven hoof.

作者戴璐

机构地区中国人民大学商学院

出处《中国软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第2期40-52,168,共14页 China Soft Science

基金中国人民大学新教师科研启动项目资助(8XNF008)

关键词双高制度环境银企博弈误导信号超额短期借款借新还旧 higher short term leverage huge cash reserve gaming disguise signal overhung bank loan debt refinancing

分类号 F830.9 [经济管理—金融学]

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