摘要
本文将中国证监会关于上市公司再融资资格与股利分配水平相挂钩的政策法规界定为"半强制分红政策",并以2008年10月9日中国证监会颁布的《关于修改上市公司现金分红若干规定的决定》(以下简称《决定》)为研究背景,首次考察了中国特殊的半强制分红政策的市场反应。实证结果表明,《决定》颁布期间资本市场整体呈倒U型走势,显示投资者对于半强制分红政策呈现出"预期—失望"的反应过程。进一步细分上市公司类型研究发现,计划再融资、高成长低自由现金流、高竞争低自由现金流的上市公司市场反应显著较差,显示半强制分红政策对有再融资需求或潜在的再融资需求的成长型以及竞争行业上市公司带来了一定的负面影响。本文认为,半强制分红政策可能存在"监管悖论"的局限性,并进一步提出了相应的政策建议。本文的研究不仅丰富了已有股利研究文献,也对完善我国股利政策法规具有重要的借鉴意义。
This paper defines the policies as the Semi-mandatory Dividend Policy, in which the China Securities Regulatory Commission （CSRC） takes the certain level of dividend paid by listed companies as a prerequisite for their refinancing qualifications. We set the ＂Decisions on Amending Some Provisions on Cash Dividends by Listed Companies＂ （hereinafter referred to as ＂the Decisions＂） released by CSRC on October 9, 2008 as the background, and research the market reactions to the Semi- mandatory Dividends Policy. The empirical results show that the capital market has an inverted U-shaped trend during the announcement of the Decisions, which means the investors experienced an ＂ expected-disappointed＂ reaction process. Furthermore, the market reactions are relatively poor for the companies that planed to refinance, the companies with high-growth and low free cash flow and the ones with low free cash flow in highly competitive industries, which shows the Semi-mandatory Dividend Policy has adverse impacts on the companies that having refinancing needs or potential refinancing needs. We argue that the Semi-mandatory Dividend Policy has to face the limitation of ＂regulatory paradox＂, and we further put forward the corresponding policy recommendations. This paper not only enriches the dividend study literature, but also helps to improve the Chinese laws and regulations on dividend policy.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期144-155,共12页
Economic Research Journal
基金
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-06-0565)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地基金(07JJD630009)
国家自然科学基金重点项目(70632001)的资助
关键词
半强制分红政策
市场反应
股利政策
投资者保护
Semi-mandatory Dividends Policy
Market Reaction
Dividend Policy
Investor Protection
