摘要
在不可再协商契约条件下,通过设计契约中的序列机制,实现校企合作双方真实披露其私人信息,从而减少机会主义行为,促使研发投资达到最优。合作创新序列机制能够提供诱因(或威胁),促使双方自觉放弃投机行为,产生有效的交易结果,使双方的专用资产投资达到最优水平。
It is studied that how to design equential mechanism of contract in the non-renegotiation conditions, making university and enterprise disclose their true private information, reducing opportunistic behavior, and promoting the R＆D investment to optimum.Sequential mechanism can provide incentives（or threat） to allow both sides to give up their opportunistic behavior, lead to a effective result of transaction, promote the investment of specific assets to optimum for university and enterprise.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第7期17-21,共5页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(08AJY028)
教育部高等学校博士学科点基金项目(200806110003)
关键词
道德风险
合作创新
私人信息
专用资产投资
不可再协商契约
序列机制
Moral Hazard
Cooperative innovation
Private Information
Relationship-specific investment
Non-Renegotiate Contract
Sequential mechanism
