摘要
考虑由一个总装制造商和一个零部件供应商组成的制造供应链,在分别分析了集中系统和分散系统的研发决策的基础上,提出了研发费用分担机制,用博弈论的方法分析了供应商的研发投入决策和制造商的分担政策,探讨了博弈均衡存在的条件和供应链的系统协调性,得出了供应链Pareto有效研发合作方案。研究发现,研发费用分担机制可以刺激研发投入增加,不仅使供应链的利润得到优化,而且可以实现双赢;但这种激励还不足以使研发投入达到最优水平,不能实现供应链的Pareto最优。最后的赋值分析验证了理论分析得到的结论。
The cooperation among the manufacturer and the supplier in a growing-period product R D was discussed in this paper.After analyzing decisions of centralized system and decentralized system respectively,a R D investment sharing policy was proposed.The optimum R D investment of the supplier and the optimum investment-sharing ratio of the manufacture were discussed with game theory approach.Further more,the existence condition of game equilibrium and the coordination of supply chain were studied.Based on this,Pareto efficient cooperative R D scheme between manufacturer and supplier was obtained.The results showed that the investment sharing policy of the manufacture could stimulate the R D investment of the supplier.As a result of that,not only the profit of supply chain was increased,but also the win-win situation was formed.However,the stimulation degree of the investment sharing policy couldn＇t make the R D investment reach the level of that would realize the Pareto optimum of supply chain.In the end,a numerical example was given to illustrate the correlative conclusions from theoretical analysis.
出处
《工业工程与管理》
北大核心
2010年第2期12-16,112,共6页
Industrial Engineering and Management
关键词
时间敏感需求
研发合作
费用分担机制
供应链协调
time-sensitive demand
R ＆ D cooperation
investment sharing mechanism
supply chain coordination
