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公立医院过度医疗的博弈模型分析及对策研究 被引量:3

Analysis and Countermeasure of Excessive Medical Treatment in Public Hospital
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摘要 伴随经济的发展,社会的进步,医疗总费用的增加,过度医疗问题也日益凸显。该文通过建立模型,从医、患、督三方博弈的角度分析公立医院过度医疗的原因;并从加大政府财政投入,对医务人员建立科学的薪酬机制,加强政府监管,积极引入第三方购买等四个方面提出相应建议。 With the development of economy,social progress and the increasing total cost of medical treatment,excessive medical care problems are also increasingly prominent.Through the establishment model,this paper analyzes the causes of excessive medical care of public hospital in terms of the game among medicine,patients and supervision and puts forward corresponding suggestion from four aspects: increasing government financial investment,establishment of medical worker's scientific compensation mechanism,strengthening the government supervision,actively introducing the third party purchase.
作者 吴焕
出处 《河南职工医学院学报》 2010年第2期225-227,共3页 Journal of Henan Medical College For Staff and Workers
关键词 过度医疗 公立医院 博弈论 excessive medical treatment public hospital game theory
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