摘要
根据委托代理理论和政府工程的特点,对政府工程中发生委托代理追求个人利益的行为进行了研究,并结合发达国家和地区的政府工程监管经验,提出了对我国政府工程项目委托监管的建议。
Based on principal-agent theory and the features of civil engineering,it studies on the behavior of chasing individual benefit during principal-agent of civil engineering project.Combining with the experiences of developed countries and areas of supervision of civil engineering,it proposes advices on mandatory supervision of civil engineering project.
出处
《山西建筑》
2010年第15期195-196,共2页
Shanxi Architecture
关键词
委托代理
政府工程
监管
principal-agent
civil engineering
supervision
