摘要
中国银行业监管有其独特的国情特质和发展历程。既有的几种主要的监管理论均无法解释中国银行业监管体制的核心特征——银行业的工具性(推动经济发展)定位和国家对银行股权、人事等的控制。本文从国家理性选择的角度对之进行了理论和历史实证分析。作者认为这种特征体现了国家的建制性实力,而拥有一定的建制性实力是国家为保证经济发展的理性选择。历史实证分析表明中国银行业的这种管制体制发挥了一定的功效,但也面临着市场化的内在冲击,其未来将取决于对国家能力的理性和动态调整。
The banking regulation in China has its own special conditions and context. Existing theories cannot explain its core features--banking industry acting as a means of economic development and state keeping control over its equities and personnel arrangements. This study examines those features based on a statism perspective, employing a neo-institutional methodology combined with holism. It is shown that the banking regulation reflects the state infrastructural power that is rationally chosen by state for keeping its economic development. The author argues that the regulation has played an important role in the economic development, although facing some problems. Its future depends on the rational and dynamic adjustments of state capacity.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期132-146,共15页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
银行监管
理性选择
建制性实力
banking regulation, rational choice, infrastructural power
