摘要
投资者保护和股权集中度之间的关系一直是学术界和实务界极为关注的问题之一。以往国内外大量研究发现投资者保护程度同股权集中度呈负相关关系,但他们都无法避免可能存在的内生性问题对研究结果的影响。而在本研究,我们利用我国证券市场中存在的控制权转移事件作为研究样本,克服了内生性问题,并对投资者保护程度与股权集中度之间的关系进行了再检验。实证结果与LLSV(1998)截然相反。我们分析认为,这一结果与之前理论并不矛盾,在我国特殊制度背景下,投资者保护和股权集中度也可能会存在正向的相关关系。研究结果意味着,提高投资者保护程度、加强对上市公司的监管是提升我国上市公司治理水平、确保我国证券市场健康有序发展的有力保障。
The relationship between investor protection and ownership concentration continues to generate substantial interest among theorists and practitioners. Though a series of studies have documented that investor protection is negatively correlated with ownership concentration, most of them suffer from endogeneity issue. Based on the events of control right transfer in China＇s A share market, which can help mitigate the endogeneity issue, this study re-examines the relationship and obtains opposite empirical result compared with prior studies. We argue that the result obtained here is not contradicted with previous studies. It is, however, determined by the particular institutional background of China. Specifically, the agency problem in Chinese listed firm is more likely to focus on the one between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, thus resulting a chance of positive correlation between investor protection and ownership concentration. The result, therefore, implies that strengthening investor protection and monitoring listed firm more effectively will enhance the level of corporate governance of listed finns and ensure future success in reform of privatization.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期167-182,共16页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
中央财经大学"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目资助
关键词
控制权转移
投资者保护
股权集中度
control right transfer, investor protection, ownership concentration
