摘要
义利之辨构成了伦理学最核心、最基本的问题。它不仅仅是中国哲学史上的一个重要命题,而且也应该是一般道德哲学的基本命题。义利问题的关键在"义",在儒家那里,它是规定人的行为的道德要求和准则,它不是主观的,而是超越的。孟子在讨论"义"时,混淆了它的主观义和客观义,但孟子的道德哲学并非康德式的自律伦理学。义是道德判断的原则,而不是它的标准。道德判断对于道德具有极为重要的意义,它使人真正得以在道德上自主。由于道德原则并非完全主观的,道德实际上是天人共主的。承认道德规范必然有例外,不会导致相对主义。现代西方伦理学无法真正处理义利问题,人类迫切需要一种新的道德哲学,这种道德哲学将以现代条件下的义利之辨作为自己的主要论题。
Telling yi （rightness） from li （profit） composes the most fundamental thesis of ethics. It is not only a significant thesis in the history of Chinese philosophy, but also should be the basic problematic of ethics in general. The crux of this matter lies in yi. In Confucianism, it is moral requirement and principle which guides human actions. It is not merely subjective, but transcendental. Meneius mixes up yi in subjective sense and in objective sense while discussing the concept yi. Nevertheless, his ethics is not a Kantian automatic ethics. Yi is the principle instead of the criterion of moral judgment. Moral judgment makes us truly automatic in moral. Moral is co-determined by tian （Heaven） and ren （humans）. The acknowledgment of exception in moral norms will not lead to relativism. Modern western ethics cannot tell yi from li. Mankind needs a new moral philosophy urgently, the main task of which is to tell yi from li in the modern conditions.
出处
《复旦学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期20-36,共17页
Fudan Journal（Social Sciences）
关键词
义利之辨
儒家伦理学
道德判断
道德原则
西方伦理学
distinction between rightness and profit
Confucian ethics
moral judgment
moral princi- ple
western ethics
