摘要
针对制造商与零售商在共同努力减少客户无缺陷退货中的双边道德风险问题,本文分析了制造商和零售商的努力水平对无缺陷退货率的影响,运用委托-代理理论设计了双边道德风险下的收益共享合同,分析了各参数对合同的影响。结果表明,最优收益共享激励系数与制造商的努力弹性系数负相关,与零售商的努力弹性系数正相关,与产品的单位收益、产品的首次销售量以及双方的努力成本系数无关。
Aiming at double moral hazard for manufacturers and retailers to make concerted efforts to reduce customers false failure returns, this paper analyzes the influence of manufacturers＇ and retailers＇ efforts on false failure returns ratio, and a revenue sharing contract under double moral hazard is designed in terms of principal--agent theory and the influence of parameters on the contract is also analyzed. The results indicate that the optimal revenue sharing incentive coefficient is negatively related to manufacturers＇ effort elastic coefficient, and positively related to retailers＇ effort elastic.coefficient, and independent of the unit revenue of product, the first sales of product, and the cost coefficient of manufacturers and retailers.
出处
《技术经济》
2010年第5期110-113,共4页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
国家"863"计划资助课题(2007AA040801)
关键词
无缺陷退货
收益共享合同
双边道德风险
false failure returns
revenue sharing contract
double moral hazard
