摘要
1998年度开始实施的《股份有限公司会计制度》赋予了我国A股上市公司对短期投资、应收账款、存货和长期投资四项资产提取减值准备的选择权,而1999年度的《补充规定》则要求A股上市公司必须对上述四项资产提取减值准备。本文通过对A股上市公司在1998年度和1999年度资产减值情况的考察,发现当上市公司面临是否提取减值准备的会计选择权时,一般是选择不予计提,即使提了,其提取比例也显著偏低。而当被强制要求执行资产减值政策时,具有扭亏动机、配股动机和临界动机的上市公司一般会选择增加(或不减少)当期收益的资产减值政策,而具有亏损动机、变更动机和利润平滑动机的上市公司一般会选择增加(或不减少)未来期间收益的资产减值政策。在控制相关因素(资产规模、负债比率、资产质量)的影响后,我们仍然发现具有不同盈余管理动机的上市公司在提取各项资产的减值准备时存在程度不同的有利于其动机利益的偏差行为。
The 'Accounting System for Shareholding Companies' in 1998 allows Chinese A-share companies to set up provisions for short-term investments, receivables, inventories, and long-term investments on a voluntary basis. The 1999 'Supplementary Provisions', however, makes these requirements compulsory policy. This paper observes the asset write-downs of A-share companies in 1998 and 1999, and finds that these companies tend not to set up any provisions if they have a choice, or the percentage is remarkably low where they do set up provisions. When the policy of asset write-downs is compulsory, companies with loss aversion, rights issue, and threshold motivations tend to increase (or not to decrease) the current earnings, while companies with loss, a change of corporate control, and smoothing motivations tend to increase (or not to decrease) future earnings. After the control of such factors as asset size, liability ratio, and asset quality, we still find that companies with different motivations for earnings management exhibit deviations of varying degrees in the benefit of their related motivations when they set up provisions for asset write-downs.
出处
《中国会计与财务研究》
2001年第4期70-157,共88页
China Accounting and Finance Review
基金
本文得到国家自然科学基金(批准号为A70072018)和上海财经大学211工程基金的资金资助,本文同时还是国家教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目《会计与财务监控制度的研究》的阶段性成果.东方证券有限责任公司的杨春燕小姐和上海大华会计师事务所有限公司的于海燕小姐在资料搜集和数据检验方面做了大量工作,《中国会计与财务研究》杂志的匿名审稿人和本刊编辑对本文提出了许多宝贵的修改意见,本文作者在此表示特别感谢,但本文的一切疏漏和可能的错误均由作者负责.
关键词
资产减值
会计选择
盈余管理
机会主义
有效订约
asset write-downs, accounting choice, earnings management, opportunism,efficient contracting