期刊文献+

中国公共部门劳动生产效率实证研究 被引量:1

An Empirical Analysis of the Productivity of China's Public Sector Employment
原文传递
导出
摘要 借鉴Karras(2007)的实证模型,本文利用中国1988-2007年30个省、市、自治区的面板数据,对公共部门的劳动生产效率进行实证分析,结果显示:(1)中国公共部门的劳动产出弹性为0.008;(2)中国公共部门的劳动边际产出高于非公共部门;(3)中国公共部门劳动人员的显性工资存在低估。虽然中国公共部门的劳动边际产出相对于非公共部门高,但其产出弹性仍处于较低水平。本文的政策含义是:加大劳动密集型公共品供给力度,有利于提高中国整个经济的产出水平;中国非公共部门需要改变劳动力粗放投入模式,地方政府应鼓励私人部门为员工提供多元化的职业培训与技能教育,以提高其边际产出。同时,优化公务员薪酬结构,将隐性收入逐步纳入正规货币工资范围之中。 Based on the theoretical model suggested by Karras ( 2007 ) , this paper estimates the productivity of public sector employment with a panel data of 30 Chinese provinces over the 1988 - 2007 period. The empirical results show that ( 1 ) the output elasticity of Chinese public employment is 0. 008 ; (2) the marginal product of public sector employment in China is higher than that of non -public sector; (3) over the past twenty years,the explicit pay of public sector employees has been underestimated. Although the marginal product of public employment is higher than that of non - public sector,its output elasticity still remains at a low value. The policy implications are evident that the enlargement of the scale of labor - intensive public goods could significantly increase the economic output given the under - provision of public goods in China. The Chinese non - public sector should change its extensive labor input practice. Local government should encourage private enterprises to offer more on -job skill training programmes to the employees and thus a higher marginal product of non - public sector will be achieved. Meanwhile, the implicit income of Chinese civil servants should be gradually included into its wage system.
出处 《经济评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第3期40-47,共8页 Economic Review
基金 国家社科基金项目"公共品定价机理研究"(项目批准号:BJY132) 国家自科基金项目"统筹城乡公共品供给的技术方法与制度路径研究"(项目编号:70673073)的阶段性成果
关键词 公共部门 劳动生产效率 边际产出 工资 Public Sector Labor Productivity Marginal Product W age
  • 相关文献

参考文献31

二级参考文献381

共引文献2240

同被引文献14

  • 1付彤杰,林黎.公务员收入、设租博弈与经济增长[J].经济问题,2007(11):7-9. 被引量:3
  • 2Becker, G. , S. , G. , J. , Stigler, '" Law Enforeemenl, Malfeasance and the Compensation of Enforcers," Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 1974, pp. 1 - 18.
  • 3Left, N.H. , "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption," The American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 8, no. 2, 1964, pp. 8 - 14.
  • 4Shleifer, A. , R. W. , Vishny, "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, 1993, pp. 599 -617.
  • 5Murphy, K. M. , Shleifer, A. , Vishny, R. W. , "Why is Rent - Seeking so Costly to Growth," American Economic Review, vol. 83, 1993, pp. 409 - 414.
  • 6Mo, P. H. , "Corruption and Economic Growth," Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 29, no. 1, 2001, pp. 66 - 79.
  • 7赵江山,杨大鹏.《发改委主任马凯:企业职工和公务员工资要增长》,http://finance.people.eom.en/GB/4215862.html,2014年3月20日.
  • 8蔡德容,李浪.腐败与反腐败的博弈经济分析[J].财经问题研究,2010(10):21-25. 被引量:7
  • 9刘勇政,冯海波.腐败、公共支出效率与长期经济增长[J].经济研究,2011,46(9):17-28. 被引量:146
  • 10公婷,吴木銮.关于以薪养廉有效性的探讨:基于中国的经验[J].经济社会体制比较,2012(5):117-129. 被引量:23

引证文献1

二级引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部