摘要
本文在不完全契约理论基础上构建了一个开放经济垄断竞争模型,考察了外资讨价还价能力的地区差异对引资结构的影响。理论分析表明:外资讨价还价能力的提高,对于外资拥有所有权优势的行业的外资流入具有显著促进作用。在此基础上,我们利用中国2001-2007年30个省市细分行业的数据,采用动态面板方法对该结论进行了实证检验。结果显示,外资讨价还价能力的提高对人力资本、物质资本、管理和研发密集型等外资拥有所有权优势行业的外资流入有显著的促进作用。并且在控制了地理集聚、市场潜力和基础设施水平等因素后,本文的实证结果依然稳健。
By incorporating incomplete contract into a monopolistic competition model in the context of open economy, this paper investigates the effect of foreign invested enterprises＇ bargaining power on industrial location of foreign invested enterprises. The theoretical analysis suggests that, regions which foreign investment enterprises have stronger bargaining power will attract foreign invested enterprises to invest in industries that they have ownership advantage. Furthermore, by using cross - industry data of 30 provinces from the year 2001 -2007, and dynamic panel data methods, we empirically test the conclusions implied in the theoretical model, and the results show that stronger bargaining of foreign invested enterprises has positive effect on foreign invested inflows in human capital, physical capital, management and R＆D intensive industries, in which foreign invested enterprises have ownership advantage. In addition, these results still hold even after controlling for geographical agglomeration, market potential and infrastructure.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期57-66,91,共11页
Economic Review
关键词
讨价还价能力
引资结构
不完全契约
Bargaining Power
Industrial Location of Foreign Invested Enterprises
Incomplete Contract
