摘要
通过构建金融监管合作的博弈模型,对我国分业监管体制下综合经营的金融集团监管合作分析,得出的基本结论是:金融监管机构的监管合作存在多重均衡,且混合策略纳什均衡得益小于纯策略纳什均衡;混合策略均衡条件下监管机构得益的大小取决于监管合作成本,得益是监管合作成本的减函数;监管机构反复博弈后最终会达到进化稳定状态,稳定状态水平由监管合作成本决定;监管合作存在监管机构同时放弃监管的"逆向激励",构成监管合作的制度漏洞。因此,需要推进主监管制度,建立信息共享机制,通过外部制度供给弥补制度漏洞,促进监管合作规范化。
According to the game theory, a comparative analysis is made over supervisory cooperation of financial holding companies under the multilateral regulation frame. Major conclusions of this thesis include,multiple - equilibrium of financial supervisory cooperation occurs, a,ul profit of mix - strategy is less than pure - strategy ＇ s, the profit of regulatory authorities is decided by the cost of supervisory cooperation in mix - strategy. There would be evolutionary stable state between regulatory authorities after repeat games, the stable state is decided by the cost of supervisory cooperation. There are＇ reverse inspirit＇ between regulatory authorities induce they give up regulation simuhaneous. Therefore, the main supervisory mechanism and information share mechanism should be chosen to repair the system leak and promote supervision standardization.
出处
《湘潭大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第4期11-17,共7页
Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(项目编号:09AZD020)
关键词
监管合作
进化博弈
进化稳定
supervisory cooperation
evolutionary game
evolutionary stable
