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第三方物流企业动态联盟成员信息传递模型 被引量:1

Membership Information Transmission Model of TPL Enterprise Dynamic Alliance
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摘要 在委托代理理论基础上,建立了没有信号传递机制时的最优契约设计模型,此时,低能力联盟成员物流服务量存在向下扭曲。为解决这一问题,引入第三方物流企业评级机构,通过盟员企业选择自身认证水平使作为核心企业的委托人能够获知代理人真实的物流能力信息。 On the basis of principal-agent theory, the paper establishes the optimal contract design model when signal transduction mechanism is unavailable, at which time the volume of logistics services of low-competence members is prone to be downwardly distorted. A solution to the problem is the incorporation of TPL enterprise rating agencies into the alliance, as a result of which the member enterprises can select their own certification standards so that the core enterprises, as the principal, can obtain the information concerning the true logistics capacity of the TPL enterprises, as the agent.
作者 李雪莲 盛鑫
出处 《物流技术》 2010年第11期83-86,共4页 Logistics Technology
关键词 第三方物流企业 动态联盟 合约机制 信息传递 TPL enterprise dynamic alliance contractual mechanism information transmission
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参考文献10

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