摘要
在中国30年的改革过程中,国有企业改革是重点领域,其主要特点是通过股份制进行公司治理结构的改革。一些企业在进行现代企业制度改造之外,还进行了所有制改革。在这个过程中,一些企业领导层利用自己的管理权,掠夺企业资产,将企业据为己有,从而实现家族控股。中国的上市公司出现了"一股独大"的局面:在上市的国有公司中,国有股占主要地位;私人上市公司往往被家族控股。因此,上市公司股票流动性不足,公众持股分散,大股东缺乏制约,小股东的利益得不到保护。因此,产权改革不能仅仅追求单一的效率,一味地强调将国有产权向企业家精英私人转化,而必须考虑社会公众的承受力和公众的判断标准。在公平中追求产权变革的效率,在稳定中寻求社会经济的发展。
As a leading role in China's economic reform, the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have experienced great transition of being transformed into joint stock companies with modern corporate governance structure. In this process, however, some top managers strip the assets of the companies, tunnel firm s value out, and even usurp the ownership of these SOEs. In current China, the ownership of shares are centralized in both state-owned listed companies where state-holding shares dominate and private listed companies where private families keep control, with a consequence of a less liquid capital market, dispersed public shareholdings, and neglected interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, the reform of the property rights system should not just seek the efficiency by transferring state owned property to the entrepreneur elites without considering the social equity, but should take the tolerance and judgment standards of the society in consideration and try to harmonize efficiency and equity and coordinate economic growth with social stability.
