摘要
在采购过程中,采购商与供应商存在着严重的信息不对称,这将增加采购成本。采购商为了鼓励供应商参与投标,规定的采购品质量标准不是特别高,中标供应商都能达到。对中标供应商而言,采购品质量还有提高的空间,但是提高质量需要花费成本,并且还具有一定的风险。针对此种情形,文章应用委托代理理论模型进行分析,研究得出采购商应与中标供应商签订质量控制契约,激励供应商努力提高采购品的质量。
During the process of the enterprise procurement,the information asymmetry between the buyer and the suppliers is quite serious,which will increase the procurement cost.The procurement quality level is set not too high and the winning suppliers all can meet it.As to the winning suppliers,it has space to enhance the quality.However,improving quality needs more cost and also has to face certain risk.The buyer should take incentive measures to prompt the suppliers to enhance quality.Using principal-agent theory,this paper designs one quality control contract which could motivate the suppliers to enhance the products＇ quality.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2010年第9期149-152,共4页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70401004)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(08JA630015)
关键词
采购质量
信息不对称
委托代理理论
契约设计
procurement quality control
information asymmetric
principal-agent theory
contract design
