摘要
基于委托代理理论,研究了道德风险条件下如何控制供应链质量的问题.建立了供应商和购买商期望收益函数,考虑了供应商存在单边道德风险(质量预防水平隐匿)和购买商存在单边道德风险(质量检验水平隐匿),以及存在双边道德风险(质量预防水平和质量检验水平均隐匿)三种情况下,如何设计质量合同设计.运用最优化原理,求解供应商和购买商的道德风险值,并量化描述所支付的信息租金.仿真实验表明:当供应商存在单边道德风险时,购买商支付的信息租金和期望收益将减少,供应商的期望收益将增加;当购买商存在单边道德风险时,供应商支付的信息租金和期望收益将减少,购买商的期望收益将增加;当存在双边道德风险时,供应链支付的信息租金为供应商和购买商存在单边道德风险时所支付的信息租金之和,供应链联合期望收益的损失最大.
Based on principal-agent theory,this paper presents a study of the problem of quality control strategy in supply chain under the condition of moral hazard.We set up the expected revenue function of suppliers and buyers to design the qucontract in the following three cases such as the single moral hazard on the part of the supplier（quality prevention probability concealed） and the single moral hazard on the part of the buyer（quality inspection probability concealed）,and double moral hazard（both quality prevention probability and quality inspection probability concealed）.According to the optimization theory,the supplier＇s and buyer＇s moral hazard values were solved.A quantitative description of the information rents was presented and a simulation test was made.The simulation results show that when there is a single moral hazard on the part of the supplier,the buyer＇s information rents and expected revenues will reduce,supplier＇s expected revenues will increase;when there is a single moral hazard on the part of the buyer,the supplier＇s information rents and expected revenues will reduce,buyer＇s expected revenues will increase;when there is a double moral hazard,the information rents of supplier chain are the sum of supplier＇s and buyer＇s information rents in single moral hazard,the loss of the jointed expected revenues of the supply chain will be maximum.
出处
《同济大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第7期1092-1098,共7页
Journal of Tongji University:Natural Science
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70832005)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772077)
上海市重点学科建设资助项目(B310)
关键词
供应链
委托代理关系
道德风险
质量控制
supply chain
principal-agent relationship
moral hazard
quality control
