摘要
公共政策执行过程是一个典型的委托-代理模型,在信息不对称条件下,作为代理人的政策执行者基于自身利益最大化的诉求,利用作为委托人的政策制定者的信息劣势、监管漏洞以及风险的分担机制,通过不作为、虚假执行和歪曲执行等方式,致使政策执行偏离预先设计的轨道,进而造成政策目标的落空或扭曲。本文将信息经济学中"道德风险"的概念和理论引入公共政策执行过程研究,以中央政府作为委托人,地方政府作为代理人,将地方政府虚假执行政策以实现自身利益最大化的行为称为公共政策执行过程中的道德风险。其产生的根本原因在于,在参与约束和激励相容约束均无法满足的条件下,中央政府和地方政府之间以及各地方政府之间基于自身利益而选择的博弈策略。央地之间的博弈具有"斗鸡博弈"的特征,具有层级隶属关系的地方政府之间的博弈符合"智猪博弈"的特点,而同级地方政府之间的博弈则属于典型的"囚徒困境"。笔者在对上述主体之间的博弈策略分别予以分析的基础上设计了以"利益整合"理念为主线的规避政策执行中道德风险现象产生的机制。
The process of public policy implementation is a typical principal-agent model. Under the condition of information asymmetry, policy implementers as agents, for maximizing their interests, will make use of information disadvantages, supervision loopholes and risk share system of policy-makers as principals, through some ways such as nonfeasance, false implementation and distorted implementation, which will lead to policy failure. Using the concept of ＂moral hazard＂, from Information Economics, to analyze public policy implementation, this paper regards central government as principal, local government as agent and names the behavior that local governments implement falsely policies for maximizing their interests as the moral hazard in the process of public policy implementation. The fundamental cause of this kind of moral hazard is that, in the case of the failure of the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint, the game tactics which central government and local governments choose will constitute Nash equilibrium. The game between central government and local governments is ＂chicken game＂, the one between the different level local governments ＂boxed pig game＂, and the one between the same level local governments is ＂prisoners＇ dilemma＂. After giving separated analysis of the process and outcome of these games, this paper designs some mechanisms based on the notion of ＂interests integration＂ of preventing and eliminating the moral hazard in the process of public policy implementation.
出处
《北京行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第4期16-23,共8页
Journal of Beijing administration institute
基金
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NECT-06-0626)
国家自然科学基金项目(70273066)
关键词
政策执行
道德风险
利益博弈
利益整合
规避机制
policy implementation
moral hazard
interests game
interests integration
elusive mechanism
