摘要
蓄意致灾事件的应急决策往往是在信息不对称的复杂情景下进行的,研究应急信息策略对辅助应急决策具有重要意义。该文考虑蓄意致灾者和应急决策者的决策相互作用,建立动态不完全信息博弈模型描述双方冲突,讨论了资源约束和信息成本对均衡的影响,并利用基于主体的仿真进行了验证。结果表明:信息策略在很大程度上影响致灾者的行动选择;应急决策者通过合理的策略隐藏关键信息,能够有效降低期望损失。应急决策者可以通过"情景—学习—应对"的决策模式获得最优策略,实现对蓄意致灾事件的有效诱导和干预。
Emergency decisions in the face of intentional threats are usually made in complex situations with asymmetric information. The emergency information disclosure strategy then becomes an important issue supporting decision-making. The interactions of the strategies of the attacker and the government are modeled as conflict in a dynamic game with imperfect information. The model illustrates the impact of the limited resources and the cost of information on the game equilibrium. This model was validated with agent-based simulations. The results show that the information disclosure strategy greatly impacts the actions of adversaries and that appropriate strategies of emergency decision-makers can reduce the losses expected by intentional attacks. An adaptive information disclosure strategy, learned from repeated games by the emergency decision-maker, is effective for mitigating intentional threats.
出处
《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第8期1163-1167,共5页
Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70973063
70833003)
关键词
应急决策
信息策略
蓄意致灾
多主体仿真
emergency decision making
information strategy
intentional threat
agent-based simulation
