摘要
本文首先对大股东与中小股东之间利益博弈的研究现状做了述评,描述了控股股东的普遍存在和大股东股权高度集中、大股东同中小股东、大股东侵占上市公司利益("隧道"理论)、控股股东同经营者合谋与中小股东的利益博弈的同股不同权的现状。阐述了我国大股东与中小股东之间利益博弈的主要特征包括表现、实现手段、后果进行了分析。构建了大股东与中小股东之间的利益博弈模型并进行了理论分析,对发展大股东与中小股东之间的利益博弈个案做了案例分析,对加强公司治理结构制度建设、保护中小股东利益、大力发展机构投资者力量、完善股东大会制度提出了建议。
This paper investigates the agency conflict between the major shareholders and the minor shareholders. The evidence implies the existence of the controlling shareholders, the trend of ownership concentration and the wealth expropriation to the minority shareholders. We also describe the main characters and the results of the agency conflict in China and construct the game model of interest between the controlling shareholders and minor share holders. After the case review of SHINEWAY Group in China, we raised practieal suggestions on how to improve the corporate governance, protect the minor shareholders, strengthen the power of institutional investors and implement the system of shareholders meetings.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第7期33-37,共5页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
关键词
股东博弈
控制权私利
公司治理结构
利益博弈
股权分置
Agency conflict Controlling interest ration Corporate govemance Wealth expropriation Equity sepatation
