摘要
市场约束是一种以市场为基础的限制银行风险承担行为的激励计划,但其作用的有效发挥取决于一系列的内外部条件,如国家隐性保险不仅可能鼓励了银行更大的风险承担行为,也降低了银行债权人的市场约束激励。结合我国银行业的制度与现实背景,通过分析市场约束对银行风险承担行为的作用机理,梳理出市场约束的相关作用机制及其环境依赖,并给出系统的研究框架,可以为隐性保险体制下的市场约束行为与机理研究指明方向。
Market discipline is a kind of market incentive plan to restrict risk-taking behaviors of banking, but its function largely depends on series of inner and exterior conditions. For instance, the governmental implicit insurance not only potentially encourages the bigger risk-taking incentives of banking, but also reduces the market discipline incentives of creditors. The paper demonstrates the functional mechanism of market discipline based on the institutional and practical background of implicit deposit insurance in China, and brings forward a systemic research framework which shows clearly the further research orientations for market discipline behaviors and mechanisms under the institution of implicit insurance.
出处
《税务与经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第4期8-14,共7页
Taxation and Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金"银行风险承担行为与市场约束治理研究"(项目编号:70903012)
复旦大学金苗项目"监管资本约束下的银行风险行为与资本套利动机"(项目编号:09JM030)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
隐性保险
市场约束
风险承担行为
信息披露
implicit insurance
market discipline
risk-taking behavior
information discipline
