摘要
基于珠三角B市和C市港资企业与政府打交道的访谈调研,从"机会"和"意愿"两个维度对行政性腐败风险进行研究。研究发现,从"机会"维度来看,政府间竞争以及企业自身话语权的上升挤压了腐败的空间,规则和财政管理制度的完善弱化了腐败的制度动力。从"意愿"维度来看,由于制度环境的变化,个体在腐败决策中需要考虑的成本上升、收益下降,腐败的意愿也在下降。虽然市场化带来了新的腐败模式,但这一模式在实践中并不多见。
Based on the interviews on the relationship between government and HK enterprises of city B and city C in the Pearl Delta area,this paper explores the risk of administrative corruption in the perspective of ＂opportunity and willingness＂.The research finds that,in the dimension of ＂opportunity＂,competition among governments and the elevation of enterprises＇ speaking right have narrowed down the space for administrative corruption;improvements of formal regulations and fiscal managerial institutions have weakened the institutional incentives of corruption.Owing to the changes of institutional environments,the cost has increased while benefit declined,which are what individuals have to take into account in the decision of corruption,thus,the willingness of corruption has decreased.Although marketization has brought out a new corruption model,it is not much seen in practice.
出处
《广州大学学报（社会科学版）》
2010年第8期5-12,36,共9页
Journal of Guangzhou University:Social Science Edition
基金
广东省普通高校人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(09JDXM81003)
关键词
行政性腐败
机会
意愿
制度激励
正式规则
administrative corruption
opportunity
willingness
institutional incentive
formal rules
