摘要
分析需求不确定与双头垄断条件下的企业技术更新决策问题。用产品市场带有随机需求参数的双头垄断模型,为不完全竞争和不确定环境下经营的企业之间的战略互动效应建模,求出了企业作为跟随者、领先者和同时更新三种条件下的最优更新临界值和价值函数,确定了博弈的两种均衡类型及其实现条件。
Corporate decision on technical replacement under uncertain demand and duopoly is analyzed.The strategic interaction effect between firms operating under imperfect competition and uncertain environment is modeled by a duopoly model with product market whose demand parameters are stochastic.The optimal replacement thresholds and value functions are drawn when a firm is follower,leader,or when both firms replace simultaneously.Two types of equilibrium of game and their realizing conditions are determined.
出处
《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2010年第5期67-70,共4页
Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition
基金
教育部科学技术研究重点项目(209148)
华侨大学社会科学基金项目(07HSK03)
关键词
技术更新
博弈论
决策
technical replacement
game theory
decision
