摘要
当前我国公共资源"市场化"配置功能尚不完备,政府仍拥有较大垄断配置权。由于制度"缺席"与权力失约,政府干预失灵就会产生"非生产性租金",在"官本位"文化影响下,受个人机会主义行为倾向驱动容易出现权力腐败现象。运用公共选择、委托—代理及寻租等理论对公共资源配置过程中的腐败行为进行定性分析,并从政治、经济、社会文化及个体因素四方面探究其多元形成机理,为真正从源头上预防与遏制腐败提供理论支持。
Currently,the function of market -oriented allocation of public resources in our country is not yet complete,governments still have great monopoly power to allocate these resources. Due to system ＂absent＂ and power without restraint,failure of government intervention could breed ＂unproductive rent＂,and then,in the driving of individual＇s opportunistic behavior tendency produced in the culture of ＂official standard＂,it is easier to breed corruption in this process. Applying some relating theories of public choice,principal-agent and rent-seeking to qualitatively analyze the corruption in the process of allocation of public resources and exploring its formation mechanism from political,economic,social cultural and individual factors could provide theoretical supports for the building of anti-corruption.
出处
《湖南大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第4期128-132,共5页
Journal of Hunan University(Social Sciences)
基金
2009年度教育部人文社会科学研究专项任务项目(廉政教育理论研究):基于测评的教育系统廉政预警管理研究
关键词
公共资源配置
腐败
形成机理
allocation of public resources
corruption
formation mechanism
