摘要
在演化博弈的基础上对不同情况下的发电侧企业的博弈支付进行假设,分析动态过程,得到了相应的演化稳定策略,由分析结果得出在市场统一清除价的情况下,市场倾向于发展到较低价策略,且大型发电企业在市场中起到相应的主导地位,而在按报价结算时,电力市场有两个不同的演化方向,需要相应的监管手段。
Based on the evolutionary game,the game payoff of generation side enterprise under different situation was assumed,the dynamic procession was analyzed and the ESS（evolutionary stable strategy） was obtained.The analysis results showed that the market tended to accept the low-price strategy and large generation would dominant electricity market under MCP（market clearing price） mode,while under PAB（pay-as-bid） mode,the market had two evolu-tionary directions,and it required appropriate regulatory measures.
出处
《华东电力》
北大核心
2010年第8期1114-1118,共5页
East China Electric Power
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(10871160)
甘肃省研究生导师基金项目(0901-08)~~
