摘要
从我国当前社会失业保险道德风险的状况出发,对社会失业保险道德风险的表现形式进行了分析,同时利用博弈分析模型揭示了社会失业保险道德风险产生的机理,并就不同的失业保险金水平下产生的道德风险问题进行了不同的激励机制设计。
Based on the current situation in China,this article analyzed the manifestation of moral hazard of social unemploy-ment insurance.Meanwhile,by using game theory analysis model,it revealed the generating mechanisms of moral hazard of unemployment insurance,and designed different incentive mechanisms for the problems of moral hazard formed in different levels of unemployment insurance benefits.
出处
《广西财经学院学报》
2010年第5期99-104,130,共7页
Journal of Guangxi University of Finance and Economics
关键词
社会失业保险
道德风险
博弈
激励机制
social unemployment insurance
moral hazard
game
incentive mechanism
