摘要
本文通过实验经济学的研究方法检验了信息对于小额健康保险投保需求的影响。实验结果表明,在信息提供不充分的情况下,小额健康保险需求相对社会最优需求水平不足,信息的充分提供能使小额健康保险需求水平显著提高。其中得知准确的疾病发生概率可以显著地提高门诊和住院保险的需求,了解更广范围的出险与理赔信息可以显著地提高住院保险的需求,但是同时提供这两种信息的并不显著优于只提供准确的疾病发生概率的信息。
This paper applied the experimental economics method to study the impact of information availability on households＇ demand for micro-insurance. It reached the conclusions that in a situation of insufficient information, micro-insurance demands fell below the optimal social demand level, and sufficient information supply would signif- icantly increase the demands for micro-insurance. Specifically, the information about the accurate probability of diseases could significantly increase demands for both outpatient micro-insurance and hospitalization micro-insur- ance, and informing the subjects of a wider population＇s healthcare spending and insurance compensation could sig- nificantly increase their demands for hospitalization micro-insurance. However, offering these two types of informa- tion abovementioned in the same time did not make the demand for micro-insurance significantly higher than the case that only the accurate probability of illness was provided.
出处
《保险研究》
北大核心
2010年第10期97-106,共10页
Insurance Studies
基金
北京大学教育基金会基金项目资助
关键词
信息
小额保险
投保需求
实验研究
information
micro-insurance
insurance demand
laboratory experiment
