摘要
本文主要研究现金股利对内部现金流与投资效率之间关系的影响,检验股利的代理模型与信号模型以及实践中强制股利的治理功能与信息甄别功能。研究结果发现,我国股票市场上,现金股利有利于抑制内部现金流富余的公司进行过度投资,支持股利的代理模型和强制股利的治理作用。但内部现金流紧缺的公司难以从以往年度连续派现或较多派现的历史记录中得到好处,缓解其投资不足问题,股利的信号模型和信息甄别功能不能得到支持。
The paper mainly examines the influence of cash dividend on the relationship between investment efficiency and internal cash flow, and then tests the agency model and signal model of cash dividend and the governance effect and information screening effect of mandatory dividend. The results suggest that cash dividend helps to restrict companies with free cash flow from over-investment, which validate the agency model and gov- ernance role of dividend. On the contrary, there is no evidence that paying more dividends or continued dividends in prior period help the companies with insufficient inlernal cash flow to mitigate underinvestment prob- lem. That is, the signal model and information screening effect are not supported in this paper.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第10期117-134,共18页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
教育部人文社科青年项目"信息不对称
融资约束程度与资本配置效率"(批准号:09YJC630140)
国家自然科学基金重点项目"公司财务管理若干基础问题研究"(项目资助批准号70632001)
福建省社科项目"转轨体制下股票市场投资者法律保护实施问题研究"(批准号:2009C018)的资助
关键词
现金股利
内部现金流
投资效率
cash dividend, internal cash flow, investment efficiency
