摘要
初始水权分配极易导致流域上下游、左右岸之间引发冲突。本文分析这种冲突存在的根源是因为部分区域分配的水权过多,而部分区域分配的水权过少。从而建立"水权过多区"群体和"水权过少区"群体间的演化博弈模型,并分析各群体的复制动态和演化稳定策略,以及演化博弈系统的稳定性,得到两个主要结论:如果"水权过少区"群体少分配的水权占其实际分配到的水权的比重较小时,博弈系统的演化稳定策略为:(不同意放弃Δq的水权,不暴发冲突);如果"水权过少区"群体少分配的水权占其实际分配到的水权的比重较大,超出其心理承受范围时,博弈系统的演化稳定策略为:(同意放弃Δq的水权,暴发冲突)。研究表明,根据演化稳定策略调整各区域的水权,可以有效化解初始水权分配中的冲突,从而构造和谐有序的用水环境。
Conflicts between both banks and between upper and lower reaches emerge easily during initial water rights allocation in river basin.The paper analyzes the causes of the conflicts because some regions allocated excessive water rights while some regions allocated too little water rights.By building an evolutionary game model of the two groups,which are ＂region with excessive water rights＂ group and ＂region with too little water rights＂ group,the replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy of both groups are analyzed;stability analysis of the evolutionary game system is also done.Two main conclusions are obtained： First,if ＂region with too little water rights＂ group are assigned to a few of its actual allocation of water rights to a small proportion,the game system＇s ESS is that ＂region with excessive water rights＂ group selects ＂don＇t agree to give up too much of the water rights＂ strategy and ＂region with too little water rights＂ group selects ＂don＇t outbreak conflicts＂ strategy.Second,if ＂region with too little water rights＂ group are assigned to a few of its actual allocation of water rights to a larger proportion,beyond the scope of their mental endurance,the game system＇s ESS is that ＂region with excessive water rights＂ group selects ＂agree to give up too much of the water rights＂ strategy and ＂region with too little water rights＂ group selects ＂outbreak conflicts＂ strategy.The result shows that if each region＇s initial water rights is adjusted according to ESS,the conflicts would be eliminated and harmonious and orderly environment for using water resource would be set up.
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第11期48-53,共6页
China Population,Resources and Environment
基金
国家"十一五"科技支撑计划重点项目(No.2007BAB28B03)
水利部公益性行业科研专项(No.200701028)
河海大学人文社会科学基金(No.2008421411)
河海大学"211工程"三期项目"技术经济及管理"子项目"长三角区域发展的技术经济及管理"资助
关键词
初始水权分配
冲突
演化博弈
演化稳定策略
initial water rights allocation
conflicts
evolutionary game
evolutionary stable strategy（ESS）
