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并购重组中大股东补偿承诺与中小股东权益保护——基于苏宁环球与世荣兆业的比较案例研究 被引量:74

The Compensation Commitment of the Major Shareholder and Protection to the Small and Medium Shareholder's Equity in M & A——Based on two Cases Comparison between the Sunning Universal and the Shirongzheye
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摘要 我们对2007年以来并购重组中大股东盈利补偿的统计发现,补偿方式主要有两种:现金补偿和股份回购(或赠送股份)补偿,而且具有明显的时间特征,即2009年11月之前均采用现金补偿方案,之后基本上采用了股份回购(或赠送股份)的补偿方案。在此基础上,通过上市公司和大股东两个层面分析出两种补偿方案均在一定程度上保护了中小股东的权益,其中,股份回购方案比现金补偿方案更能改善上市公司财务状况和经营业绩,同时更能制约大股东在并购重组活动中对过高评估或过高盈利预测的"冲动",因而更能保护中小股东权益。 We found there are two main methods of compensation : cash compensation and stock repurchase ( or gift shares) compensation in the major shareholder profit compensation through surveying M & A since 2007. At the same time, with a clear time characteristics, namely, in November 2009 used the cash compensation program, after November 2009 essentially adopted the share repurchase (or gift shares) compensation. Basing on this, we found the two kinds of compensation programs protect the interests of small shareholders, among them, share repurchase program are better than cash compensation scheme which can improve the listed company's financial position and operating performance, at the same time, it more restricted the "impulse" on the profit forecasts of shareholder which are too high or excessive assessment in M & A activity. Therefore, it can better protect the rights and interests of small shareholders.
出处 《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第11期55-63,共9页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"社会资本视角下上市公司终极股东控制与剥夺问题研究"(71072072) 国家社会科学基金项目"新形势下企业并购问题研究--外资并购中的国有股权定价研究"(09BJY056)
关键词 并购重组 盈利预测 大股东承诺 现金补偿 股份回购 股东权益保护 M & A profit forecast commitment of the major shareholder cash compensation stock repurchase protect of the shareholders' rights
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